This paper examines the relation between corporate governance mechanisms and earnings management. Using data collected from New Zealand listed companies for the financial year ending in 2005, the results show that the size of the board of directors is significantly positively associated with earnings management. This suggests that larger boards seem to be ineffective in their oversight duties relative to smaller boards. On the other hand, the independence of the board of directors, the independent role of the board chair and chief executive officer, and the independence of audit committees are not significantly associated with earnings management. Thus, these three corporate governance mechanisms are ineffective at monitoring the discretionary choices of management. The lack of effective corporate governance in New Zealand, particularly with regard to boards of directors, is mainly due to the lack of "experience and skills required to oversee the scale, complexity, and characteristics of finance operations" (Ministry of Economic Development, 2009, p.8).
Introduction
Following recent financial reporting scandals and corporate collapses, the importance of corporate governance has gained a great deal of attention. Corporate governance is the structures and processes that a company has in place to monitor the actions and decisions of an organization's management. Corporate governance plays an integral role in ensuring integrity in the preparation of financial reports. Earnings management can undermine corporate governance by distorting an organization's profit, in order for managers to obtain private benefits. The effectiveness of corporate governance in minimizing the occurrence of earnings management has become an increasingly debated topic in academic accounting, the accounting profession, and throughout accounting-standards-setting bodies.
In order for managers to convey information regarding the financial performance of their company, standard setters have permitted managers to exercise judgment in selecting reporting methods and making estimates and disclosures so that financial reports provide quality information to users (Healy and Wahlen, 1999) . Allowing managers to exercise judgment in the preparation of financial statements can provide opportunities for them to manipulate earnings to fulfill their personal goals. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) allow managers to exercise judgment in reporting financial statements. This, in turn, provides them with opportunities to structure transactions and present financial reports in a way that may mislead stakeholders as to the true financial performance of a firm (Nelson, Elliot, and Tarpley, 2003) . Healy and Wahlen (1999, p. 368 ) define earnings as follows: "Earnings management occurs when managers use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to either mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic performance of the company or to influence contractual outcomes that depend on reporting accounting numbers."
The issue of earnings management has become an increasingly debated topic, and, as a consequence, there has been a large amount of pressure put on companies, in particular listed companies, to ensure that they have strong corporate governance mechanisms in place to minimize the risk of fraud and to monitor the actions and decisions of executive management. In 2003, the New Zealand Stock Exchange (NZX) introduced into its listing rules the NZX Corporate Governance Best Practice Code (NZX, 2003a). The reason for releasing this code was that "Good corporate governance is an important tool in promoting investor confidence in listed companies by providing a framework for transparency and accountability" (NZX, 2003b, p. 3) . Strong corporate governance processes and structures should ensure the integrity of financial reporting, so that reliable and accurate profit (or loss) figures are reported to both current and future shareholders.
It is generally accepted that there are a number of factors that will influence the effectiveness of corporate governance in an organization. The first and most important part of any corporate structure is the board of directors. It is widely held that "the board of directors is the highest internal control mechanism responsible for monitoring the actions of top management" (Beasley, 1996, p. 444) . As a result of this view, it is important that the board of directors should remain independent of influence from management to ensure that it acts in the best interests of the company's shareholders. Other mechanisms that may influence corporate governance in an organization include the existence and effectiveness of an audit committee and the existence of an internal audit function (Peasnell, Pope, and Young, 2005) .
This paper attempts to investigate the role of corporate governance in constraining the magnitude of earnings management. It examines the relation between corporate governance mechanisms (as measured by board size and independence of board of directors, independent role of the board chair, and independent audit committees) and earnings management (as measured by discretionary accruals) for firms listed on the NZX for the financial year ending in 2005. Prior research in the area of earnings management has for the most part focused on data collected from United States (US), United Kingdom (UK), and Australian listed companies. This study is distinctive due to the smaller size, geographical isolation, and less regulated nature of New Zealand listed companies. The characteristics inherent in New Zealand companies provide a unique setting to examine the association between corporate governance structures and the magnitude of earnings management. The results show that the size of the board of directors is significantly positively associated with earnings management. This suggests that larger boards seem to be ineffective in their oversight duties relative to smaller boards. On the other hand, the independence of board of directors, the independent role of the board chair and chief executive officer (CEO), and the independence of audit committees are not significantly associated with earnings management. Thus, these three corporate governance mechanisms are ineffective at monitoring the discretionary choices of management.
The lack of effective corporate governance in New Zealand has recently been exposed by a significant number of finance and non-finance company collapses in New Zealand since 2007 (Yahanpath, 2010) . A concern was raised by the Ministry of Economic Development in 2009 that suggested that boards of the failed finance companies tended to "lack the experience and skills required to oversee the scale, complexity, and characteristics of finance operations...too often directors were not adequately informed, misled or failed to take sufficient interest in the affairs of the company (Ministry of Economic Development, 2009, p.8).
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the prior literature and hypotheses development. The research design is developed in section 3, while section 4 reports the results. Section 5 contains the summary and conclusions.
Prior literature and hypotheses development
Corporate governance is the procedures, processes, and functions put in place in an organization to monitor or oversee the actions of management. The mechanisms that we examine in the present paper are the size of the board of directors, the independent board of directors, the independent role of the board chair and CEO, and the independent audit committees.
Board size
Prior literature provides conflicting results about the direction of the relationship between board size and earnings management. Several studies report positive relationships between board size and earnings management (Jensen, 1993 (Dalton et al., 1999; Beasley and Salterio, 2001) , and may provide better services and be more effective in preventing firm failure (Chaganti and Mahajan, 1985) . Given these conflicting results, we hypothesize a positive association between independent directors and earnings management (Davidson et al., 2005) . Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H1: Earnings management is positively associated with the size of the board of directors.
Independent board of directors
Agency relationships exist when principals (owners/shareholders) hire the agents (managers/board of directors) to perform a service on behalf of the principals. In an agency relationship, shareholders often delegate decisionmaking authority to the board of directors. As a result, agency problems may arise due to the existence of divergent objectives between the principals and agents. There have been a number of studies (e.g., Brickley and James, 1987; Weisbach, 1988; Byrd and Hickman, 1992) supporting the hypothesis that independent directors protect shareholders when there is an agency problem. The board of directors is considered to be the most important governance mechanism in any firm, as it will form the base for which other governance structures are incorporated (Fama and Jensen, 1983 ). In addition, independent directors are needed in order to monitor and control the actions of directors whose behavior is opportunistic (Jensen and Meckling, 1976) . Independent directors are non-executive directors who have no relationship with the company beyond their roles as directors (Davidson et al., 2005 
Independent role of the board chair and CEO
The board chair plays an important role between the CEO and the board on decision making by the board. In addition, the relationship between management and the board needs to be smooth and cohesive. This can be facilitated if the roles of the board chair and CEO are clearly separated and if the board chair is an independent director. The separation of the roles of board chair and CEO can also avoid a considerable concentration power in the hands of the CEO (Beasley, 1996) . However, prior studies indicate that separating the role of the chair and CEO has no effective monitoring function in restraining earnings management ( 
Independent audit committees
The audit committee is a subcommittee of the board of directors, which delegates its responsibilities to board committees such as the audit, executive, compensation, and nomination committees. The audit committee is responsible for overseeing the financial reporting process on behalf of the board of directors. It is also responsible for reviewing a company's financial statements, internal accounting controls, and the audit process (Klein, 2002a) . Its main purpose is to enhance the creditability of audited financial statements (Bradbury et al., 2006) . Audit committees are now a mandatory requirement of companies listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the NASDAQ Stock Market, as well as the requirement that all committee members are non-executive board members (Klein, 2002a) . In New Zealand, the NZX Corporate Governance Best Practice Code (NZX, 2003a) placed into its listing rules the requirement for companies to establish an audit committee, as well as recommending that this audit committee should consist of exclusively non-executive directors. However, as with the independence requirements for the board of directors, listed companies can opt out of this requirement, provided adequate disclosure is made in the annual report as to the non-existence or non-independence of the audit committee (NZX, 2003a). The effectiveness of the audit committee in limiting instances of earnings management may be affected by a number of factors, such as the independence of audit committee members. Other factors that have been identified that may influence the effectiveness of an audit committee are the audit committee size, the frequency of meetings, the number of meetings with the external auditor, and the expertise of the audit committee. However, these additional factors have been tested and were found to provide inconclusive results (Xie, et The present paper looks at the independent audit committee only. In order to function effectively, the audit committee must be independent of the management, as it allows both the internal and external auditors to remain free of interference from corporate management (Vicknair et al., 1993) . The independent audit committee has been found to be significantly negatively associated with earnings management in several prior studies (e.g. Klein . Given these inconclusive results, we hypothesize a negative association between independent audit committees and earnings management. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H4: Earnings management is negatively associated with the proportion of independent directors on the audit committee.
Research design

Sample
The sample consists of 177 firms listed on the NZX and is based on the financial year January Thus, 95 firms are included in the final sample, which is further divided into sector and industry group according to the NZX classification system, as shown in Table 1 . 
Measurement of the variables
Earnings management
The dependent variable is earnings management. Prior literature has measured it using a number of different techniques [1] . One of the most commonly used measures of earnings management normally focuses on accruals and more specifically the discretionary component of total accruals. A number of different models have been developed that attempt to separate total accruals into their discretionary and non-discretionary components.
The most commonly used are the Jones (1991) and the modified-Jones (Dechow et al., 1995) models. This study adopts a cross-sectional version of the modified-Jones model which estimates a firm's non-discretionary accruals (NDAC) as a function of the changes in revenues adjusted by the change in accounts receivables, and the level of property, plant, and equipment (Dechow et al., 1995) [2] . The rationale is that a firm's working capital requirements depend on revenues, while its depreciation (and perhaps deferred taxes) accruals depend on the level of property, plant, and equipment (Subramanyam, 1996) . To compute the non-discretionary accruals, we first estimate ordinary least squares regressions of total accruals on the change in revenues and the gross level of property, plant, and equipment (PPE) from the Jones (1991) model in Equation 1 below.
(
where TAC ij,t = total accruals for company i in industry j in year t, TA ij,t-1 = total assets for company i in industry j in year t-1, ∆REV ij,t = change in revenues for company i in industry j in year t, PPE ij,t = gross property, plant and equipment for company i in industry j in year t, ε ij,t = error term for company i in industry j in year t.
This equation estimates the parameters for normal business operations for all companies in an industry for which the NDAC can be calculated. The portion (or residual) of total accruals that cannot be explained by these normal operating activities is said to be the discretionary component of total accruals (Jones, 1991 As explained by Jones (1991, p. 212), all terms in the total accruals expectation model are scaled by last-year total assets (TA t-1 ) to reduce heteroscedasticity because "lagged assets are assumed to be positively associated with variance of the disturbance terms." Jones found that the error terms from the expectation model when calculated using unscaled data were highly correlated with lagged assets. Total accruals (TAC) in Equation 1 are calculated using the cash flow approach, a method that has been widely used in previous research [3] . Under this approach, a company's TAC are calculated as the difference between the net income (earnings) before extraordinary items and net cash flows from operations for the financial year [4] . It is noted that the original Jones (1991) model did not adjust the change in revenues by the change in accounts receivables, and, as a result, it assumed that all of a company's revenues in the estimation period were free from management manipulations (Dechow et al., 1995) . However, by adjusting the change in revenues for the change in accounts receivable, the modified-Jones model shown in Equation 2 below implicitly makes the assumption that changes in credit sales are to some extent due to managers exercising discretion in the timing of reporting the revenues (Dechow et al., 1995) . That is, there is a possibility that managers could have manipulated credit sales by changing credit terms.
Using the estimates from the regression parameters in Equation 1, ̂ , ̂ and ̂ , we estimate the NDAC using the modified-Jones model as displayed in Equation 2 below:
where NDAC ij,t = non-discretionary accruals for company i in industry j in year t, TA ij,t-1 = total assets for company i in industry j in year t-1, ∆REV ij,t = change in revenues for company i in industry j in year t, ∆REC ij,t = change in receivables for company i in industry j in year t, PPE ij,t = gross property, plant and equipment for company i in industry j in year t, ε ij,t = error term for company i in industry j in year t. ̂ , ̂ and ̂ are industry-specific coefficients which are estimated using a cross-sectional version of the model developed by Jones (1991) as displayed in Equation 1.
We then calculate the discretionary accruals, DAC ij,t , as the remaining portion of total accruals, TAC ij,t , as follows:
This study is concerned with instances of income increasing as well as income decreasing earnings management. Consistent with prior research, the absolute value (or magnitude) of discretionary accruals is used as the measure for the dependent variable, earnings management (Becker et al., 1998; Davidson et al., 2005 ).
Corporate governance variables
Corporate governance is the independent variable that includes board size, independence of board of directors, independent role of the board chair and CEO, and independence of audit committee.
Board size This is measured as the number of directors on the board.
Independence of board of directors
The board of directors is considered to be the most important governance mechanism, as it will form the base for which other governance structures are incorporated. To test the belief that board independence is negatively associated with earnings management, a measure of board independence needs to be established. We first use a dummy variable for board independence with a value of 1 if the board is composed of a majority of nonexecutive directors, and 0 otherwise (Model 1).
In addition to this measure, this study looks at two other important features of board independence. The literature highlighted the importance of having outside or non-executive directors on the board, and, as such, this study measures independence of board of directors as the proportion of non-executive directors occupying the board. This is calculated by dividing the number of non-executive directors by the number of directors that are present on the board of directors (Model 2). The other definition of independence of board of directors is the independence of directors as defined under the NZX listing rules. Under this definition, independent board of directors is measured as the proportion of board members who have no relationship with the company outside that of their role as a director. This is calculated by dividing the number of independent board of directors (information on that is required to be disclosed in annual reports) by the total board size (Model 3).
Independent role of the board chair and CEO
This is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the roles of the board chair and CEO are separated, and 0 otherwise.
Independence of audit committee
The most commonly used measure for audit committee independence has focused on the number of non-executives who are members of this committee. This measure has also been found to be the most effective measure of audit committee independence. Accordingly, we measure audit committee independence as the proportion of nonexecutive (or outside) directors who are members of the audit committee to the size of the audit committee. This measure will be presented under the additional analysis section. We also measure audit committee independence similar to that of Davidson et al. (2005) . Model 4 employs a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the audit committee is composed solely of non-executive directors, and 0 otherwise. Model 5 employs a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the audit committee is composed of a majority of non-executive directors, and 0 otherwise.
Control variables
As discussed by Bartov et al. (2001) a large amount of earnings management research fails to control for the effect of other factors that may be correlated with either earnings management or corporate governance. Control variables need to be included in the regression model to ensure that earnings management that occurs as a result of weak corporate governance identified is not earnings management that is the result of other confounding factors. Consistent with research by Klein (2002a) and Davidson et al. (2005) , the absolute change in net income before extraordinary items scaled by last year total assets (ABSCH) is included in the regression as a company's earnings performance has been found to be positively associated with instances of earnings management. Leverage (LEV) is another control variable. It is measured as the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. It has been found to be positively associated with earnings manipulations when a firm is close to breaching debt covenants (Klein, (Park and Shin, 2004) . This is measured as the market value of shareholders' equity divided by the book value of equity. The final control variable is firm size (SIZE) and is measured by the natural log total assets. It is found to be negatively associated with earnings management as larger firms are more carefully monitored by the market and other stakeholders, making them more difficult to engage in earnings management (Klein, The summary of the measurement of the variables is shown below.
Dependent Variable Measured as Represented by
Earnings Management Now that all the variables to be used in this study have been defined and measured, the following section provides an outline of the regression model that is used to test the hypotheses.
Statistical tests
The following regression model is used to test the hypotheses: DAC = + β 1 BDSIZE + β 2 BDIND + β 3 INDCHAIR + β 4 ACIND + β 5 LEV + β 6 MKTBK + β 7 ABSCH + β 8 SIZE + ε (4) where DAC is the absolute value of discretionary accruals estimated using the crosssectional modified-Jones (i.e., Dechow et al., 1995) model; the remaining variables are as previously defined, and ε is an error term. For the sake of brevity, we do not display the subscripts for firm i, industry j, and time t. Table 2 displays the descriptive statistics for the variables that were used in the regression model. Panel A displays the financial variables that were used to calculate discretionary accruals. It shows that the average firm has reported total assets of $453.3 million, net income of $31.4 million, and cash flow from operations of $49.5 million. The average firm has reported negative total accruals equal to 4.8% of lagged total assets. Panel B displays the continuous regression variables. It shows the number of directors on board is approximately 5.8, the proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors is 81%, and the proportion of independent directors on the board of directors is lower at 60%. The average absolute value of discretionary accruals calculated using the modified-Jones model is approximately 8% of lagged total assets. The average absolute change in net income was approximately 7% of last-year total assets, while the average company had a leverage ratio 0. 44 . Previous research has demonstrated that these two variables are positively associated with the occurrence of earnings management (Klein, 2002a; Klein 2002b; Davidson et al., 2005) . The average market-to-book ratio is approximately 2.9. This ratio has been found in prior research to be positively associated with the independence of board of directors (Klein, 2002b; Davidson et al., 2005) . Panel C displays the dummy variables used in the regression model. It shows 94% of firms having a majority of non-executive directors on the board. The same percentage of firms has separated the role of the board chair and CEO. Panel C also shows 90% of firms having an audit committee composed solely of non-executive directors, and 100% of firms having an audit committee composed of a majority of non-executive directors. Some 96% of audit committee members are nonexecutives (not reported). 
Results
Descriptive statistics
*** Significant at 0.01 level, ** Significant at 0.05 level, * Significant at 0.10 level a SPSS computes the exact correlation regardless of whether they are continuous or dummy variables (Davidson et al., 2005) . Table 3 provides a Pearson correlation analysis between the dependent and independent variables in the regression model [5] . Most corporate governance variables are not significantly related to discretionary accruals, a proxy for earnings management. Board size is positively related to DAC but not significant. Leverage is significantly positively related to DAC, while firm size is significantly negatively related to DAC. As illustrated in Table 3 , there is no multicollinearity among the independent variables. The highest correlation for the independent variables is between board size and firm size, with a coefficient of 0.547 which is less than 0.80 or 0.90. In addition, none of the independent variables has a variance inflation factor greater than 10, confirming that collinearity presents no concern for this study. It is noted that ACIND_Model 4 is significantly related to BDIND (Models 1 to 3) . As a result, we do not include both the independence of board of directors (BDIND) and the independence of audit committee (ACIND) in the same regression (see Models 1, 2, and 3 in Table 4 ) but provide additional robustness tests under additional analysis in section 4.3.
Multivariate results
The results of the multivariate analysis of Equation 4 are shown in Table 4 . Models 1, 2, and 3 do not include the independence of audit committee (ACIND) in the same regression with the independence of board of directors (BDIND), as the audit committee is a subcommittee of the board and thus the variables are not independent (Bradbury et al., 2006) . This is further supported by the significant correlation between the two variables, as shown in Table 3 . In Model 1, BDIND is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the board is compose of a majority of non-executive directors, and 0 otherwise. In Model 2, BDIND is measured as a proportion of non-executive directors on the board of directors. In Model 3, BDIND is measured as proportion of independent directors on the board of directors. Models 4 and 5 do not include BDIND in the same regression with ACIND for the same reason explained above; that is, we replace BDIND with ACIND. In Model 4, ACIND is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the audit committee is composed solely of non-executive directors, and 0 otherwise. In Model 5, ACIND is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the audit committee is composed of a majority of non-executive directors, and 0 otherwise. However, we also include both ACIND and BDIND in the same regression to provide additional robustness tests under additional analysis in section 4.3. The results in Table 4 indicate that board size (BDSIZE) in Models 1 to 5 is positively significantly related to DAC, a proxy for earnings management, thus supporting Hypothesis 1. These results are consistent with the findings of Jensen (1993), Dechow et al. (1996) , Beasley (1996) There is no significant relationship between BDIND and DAC in Models 1 [6] to 3, thus rejecting Hypothesis 2. This finding is in contrast to that found by several studies (Beasley, 1996 Klein (2002b) found that although it is important to have independent audit committees, often the nonexecutives lack the involvement and inside knowledge to detect subtle earnings manipulations. Nevertheless, the result is in contrast with that found by Klein In summary, the insignificant relationship between DAC and other corporate governance variables (BDIND, INDCHAIR, and ACIND) may be due to the inability of the independent board of directors and the audit committee in performing their oversight duties to constrain earnings management and the dominance of the CEO over board matters.
Finally, among the control variables, we find only firm leverage (LEV) and size (SIZE) to be significantly positively and negatively related to DAC, respectively. This suggests that a firm with high leverage is more likely to engage in earnings management. The result is consistent with prior studies that have found leverage to be positively associated with earnings manipulations when a firm is close to breaching debt covenants (Klein, 2002a; Bartov et al., 2001; Davidson et al., 2005) . In addition, the negative relation between SIZE and DAC suggests that larger firms are more carefully monitored by the market and other stakeholders, making it more difficult for them to engage in earnings management. This finding is consistent with those found by prior studies (Klein, 
Additional analysis
Additional sensitivity tests are performed to see if our results are robust to different specifications. We now include both of the independent variables, the independence of board of directors (BDIND) and the independence of audit committee (ACIND), in the same regression, as our earlier test included only one of the two variables at a time in the regression when the results were presented in Table  4 . We then apply different definitions of the independent variables as defined earlier. First, we define ACIND as a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the audit committee is composed solely of nonexecutive directors, and 0 otherwise (the same measure as in Model 4 previously). Results are shown in Table 5 . The regression results in Table 5 are similar to those shown in Table 4 earlier, with the exception of a marginally negative significance at the 0.10 level for ACIND under Model 3. Second, when ACIND is a dummy variable with a value of 1 if the audit committee is composed of a majority of non-executive directors, and 0 otherwise (the same measure as in Model 5 previously), the results are quantitatively similar to Table 4 under Models 1 to 3 but without a significant result at the 0.10 level for ACIND (not reported). Third, when ACIND is defined as the proportion of non-executive directors on the audit committee board, the results are quantitatively similar to Table 4 under Models 1 to 3 (not reported). Again, no significant result was found at the 0.10 level for ACIND. Finally, when BDIND is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the board is composed of a majority of independent directors on the board of directors, and 0 otherwise, the results are also very similar to those reported in Table 4 under Models 1 to 3. Overall, the sensitivity tests support the initial findings provided in Table 4 . 
Summary and conclusions
The objective of this paper is to investigate the role of corporate governance in constraining the magnitude of earnings management. It examines the relation between earnings management (as measured by discretionary accruals) and corporate governance mechanisms (as measured by board size and independence of board of directors, independent role of the board chair, and independent audit committees) for firms listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange for the financial year ending in 2005. Prior research in the area of earnings management has mainly focused on relatively larger markets, such as the US, UK, and Australia. Our paper is distinctive due to the smaller size, geographical isolation, and less regulated nature of New Zealand listed companies. Therefore, the findings based on larger markets may not be generalized to New Zealand. The results show that the size of the board of directors is significantly positively associated with earnings management, thus supporting our Hypothesis 1. This suggests the view that larger boards seem to be ineffective in their monitoring function to constrain earnings management relative to smaller boards and are susceptible to the CEO's control over board matters. Thus, New Zealand firms may overinvest in the number of members on the board of directors. With respect to our Hypothesis 2, which examines the association between the independence of board of directors and earnings management, no significant relationship was found in Models 1 to 3. Thus, Hypothesis 2 is rejected. The findings also do not support Hypotheses 3 and 4 concerning the associations between the independent role of the board chair and CEO and the independence of audit committees with respect to earnings management. Thus, these three corporate governance mechanisms are ineffective at monitoring the discretionary choices of management. The lack of effective corporate governance in New Zealand, particularly with regard to boards of directors, is mainly due to the lack of "experience and skills required to oversee the scale, complexity, and characteristics of finance operations" (Ministry of Economic Development, 2009, p.8).
Endnotes
1.
Tests of earnings management include the assessment of accounting policy changes (Healy, 1985; Sweeney, 1994 provided a similar result to that of Model 1 when BDIND is defined as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the board is composed of a majority of independent directors on the board of directors, and 0 otherwise.
